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BORROWER TRANSACTION COSTS AND CREDIT RATIONING IN 
RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE PHILIPPINE CASE* 
by 
Virginia G. Abiad, CarloS E. CuevaS 
and DouglaS H. Graham** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The.importance of transaction coStS in credit allocation and 
itS role in the rationing of credit haS been clearly Shown in 
y -
pafet StudieS. Transaction coStS are the non-intere'st expenSeS 
incurred by borrowers aS well aS lenders. They reSult from the 
information gathering procedure's of banks to determine borrower 
creditworthiness and/or to comply with Central Bank regulations. 
*Paper presented during the ACPC-PIDS-OSU SponSored Seminar-
workShop on "Financial Intermediation in the Rural Sector: 
ReSearch ReSultS and Policy ISSueS" held on 26-27 September 1988 
at the Cuaderno Hall, Central Bank of the Philippines. ThiS iS 
part of a larger Study on comparative bank analySiS jointly con-
ducted by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), Philip-
pine Institute for Development studies (PIDS) and Ohio State 
University (OSU). The project waS coordinated by Dr. Mario B. 
Lamberte (PIDS) and Dr. V. Bruce J. Tolentino (ACPC). 
**ReSpectively, Division Chief, Policy and Planning Divi-
sion, ACPC, ASSiStant ProfeSSor, OSU and ProfeSSor, OSU 
The viewS expressed in this Study are thoSe of the authors 
and do not neceSSarily reflect thoSe of the Institute. 
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CuevaS (1984), CuevaS and Graham (1984), Ahmed (1982), 
Inter-American Development Bank (1983), Ladman (1984), among 
otherS. 
Transaction coStte are a measure of the "friction" existing 
in the functioning of financial markets (Cuevate 1984). They are 
likely to increase the coStS of intermediation beyond the level 
imposed by the explicit interest rate. Ate a result, the 
efficiency of the financial Sector in the performance of its 
resource allocation function may decline. 
Borrower transaction coStS, which is the main concern of 
thiS Study, iS made up of the actual caSh outlay and the 
opportunity coSt of time Spent in applying for, Securing and 
repaying a loan. The longer the time taken to evaluate and 
process a loan, the' greater the transaction coStS for the 
borrower—aS Seen in the longer hourS Spent in the bank 
premiSeS, more frequent tripS to the bank, greater expenSeS for 
transportation and food and poSSibly, higher feeS. Thite 
lengthening of processing time is a common tool of credit 
rationing (Ahmed 1982). 
ThiS Study lookS at borrower transaction coStS in rural 
financial markets (RFMS) and its role in the rationing of credit 
in the Philippines. More Specifically, its objectives are: 1) 
to quantify borrower transaction cotetS; 2) to identify, the 
factors that determine and are determined by the level of 
2 / 
transaction coStS; and 3) to determine the role of transaction 
coStS aS a credit rationing mechaniSm in RFMS, both during the 
2/ 
UnleSS otherwise i n d i c a t e d a l l Succeeding references to 
transaction coStS (TC) refer to borrower transaction coStS. 
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period of intere'st rate regulation and after the deregulation of 
interest rateS. The following questions which operationalize the 
above objectives are addreSSed: 
1. What iS the magnitude of borrower transaction coStS? 
2. How dp borrower transaction coStS affect borrower 
demand for and acceSS to credit? 
3. What are the determinants of theSe transaction coStS? 
4. IS credit rationing through transaction coStS relative-
ly more widespread and important when interest rateS 
are restricted than when they are deregulated? 
A brief background of the Study iS presented in Section II 
followed by the theoretical framework and methodology. The major 
findings are presented in Secti'on III and the conclusions and 
policy implications in Section IV. 
II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Background of the Study 
Provision of agricultural credit waS a government priority 
even in the 1950S and 1960S. However, it waS only in the mid-70S 
that the Philippines received unprecedentedly large amounts of 
financial aid from international donorS for on-r-lending to the 
agricultural Sector. The government then launched various credit 
programs to make Small-farm credit attractive and viable for 
financial institutions. The largest of theSe credit programs, 
both in amount and number of farmer borrowers, waS MaSagana 99, a 
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credit program for rice farmers launched in 1973. By 1980, the 
government had 25 different supervised credit programs. The 
Central Bank's rediScounting window waS the motet Significant 
Source of Subsidized funds for agricultural credit from 1970 to 
1985. 
Various formS of intervention eaSed the flow of credit to 
the rural Sector aS part of monetary policy. Noteworthy among 
thetee were a) the Credit Quota Scheme which required all bankS to 
Set aside at leaSt 25 percent of net loanable fundte for 
agricultural credit; b) the Deposit Retention Scheme which 
required all branches and extension offices of commercial bankte 
and thrift bankS to allot 75 percent of total deposits in a 
region to loanS and investments in that Same region; and c) the 
imposition of ceilings on teavingte and time deposit rateS aS well 
aS on lending rateS. 
The reSultS of motet of theSe credit programs were very 
disappointing. Studiete tehow that contrary to the intentions of 
the program, a very Small portion of the funds (10%) reached the 
Small farmers, and loan arrearages—particularly for supervised, 
non-collateralized and Small agricultural loanS—-were high. 
(Sacay et al. 1986). The rural financial institutions involved 
mainly rural bankS were Set back ate a reteult of high levels of 
unpaid loanS. Distortions to incentives were evident in their 
financial intermediation function, resulting from their eatey 
acceSS to discounted funds with preferential interest rateS and 
from the lack of local depoSit mobilization. 
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In 1981, government policy Started to Shift away from the 
* 
Stance of Strong intervention in financial markets that prevailed 
in the ' 70te, and gradually moved toward itS preteent policy of 
interest rate liberalization. SavingS and time deposit rateS 
were deregulated in 1981, lending rateS in 1983, and rediScounted 
Short term agricultural loanS in 1984. However, it waS only when 
the policy of cheap rediScounting waS discontinued in November 
1985 that deregulation of lending interest rateS can be Said to 
have truly taken effect. (Lamberte and Lim 1987, Llanto 1986). 
On this baSiS, November 1985 iS uSed aS the cut-off date for the 
Regulated (1972 to 1985) and Deregulated (1986 to 1987) periods 3/ 
in thiS Study. 
B. Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
In an environment of interest rate regulation, interest rate ceilings imposed by monetary authorities prevent interest ratete 
from moving to the market equilibrium rate. ThiS reSultS in an 
exceSS demand for credit (Q Q ) at the ceiling rate of i . The 
ted r 
lower the imposed ceiling on i relative to the market rate, the 
greater will be the unSatiSfied demand for credit. 
Since in effect a Shortage of credit would exist at the 
regulated rate, lenders would have to apportion thiS Short 
Supply among all thoSe who are applying for a loan. A. more com-
plicated credit delivery teytetem will reSu.lt aS various kindte of 
~ 3/ , — ~ 
In considering theSe two periods, it iS important to 
recognize that loan riSkS roSe in the mid-1980S (compared to 
the late 1970S and early 1980S) due to the onSet- of the 
world recession which affected the country. 
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Selection/Screening procedures are uSed by lender^ to determine 
who of the prospective borrowers will get a loain and who will be 
rejected (Ladman 1983). TheSe procedures will alSo determine the 
amount that will be rationed out to each of the "acceptable" 
borrowers. 
TheSe information gathering procedures, designed to aSSeSS 
each borrower-applicant'S cred'it worthiness, reSult in 
"transaction" coStS to lenders aS well aS to borrowers. Lenders 
incur coStS associated with evaluating, disbursing and collecting 
loanS. Lender transaction coStS increase the marginal coStS (MC) 
of financial institutions and ShiftS the Supply curve to the 
left, S" in Figure 1. At the regulated rate therefore, lenders 
are willing to lend out Q an amount Smaller than Q . At Q 
s s s 
while lenders are constrained to charge the interest rate i , 
r 
borrowers are willing to pay a much higher rate for credit, i'. 
Borrowers will therefore continue to Seek credit equivalent to 
Q 1 aS long aS their transaction coStS are leSS than or equal to 
S 
the margin i'i . The lower the restricted interest rate, the 
r 
greater the transaction coStS that borrowers will be willing to 
abSorb and vice verSa. 
The simultaneous Equations Model 
Transaction coStS are Seen aS affecting both lender and 
borrower behavior. under the assumption that transaction coStS 
are considered by borrowers aS part of the total loan price, then 
the correct model iS a SyStem of simultaneous equations in which 
7 
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transaction coStS and loan amount are endogenous variables 
(CuevaS and Graham 1985). 
The Simultaneous Equations Model Specified by CuevaS and 
Graham ite tested empirically on the Survey data uSing the two-
Stage leaSt SquareS (TSLS) method. The model conSiStS of two 
equations: a) A Loan Demand Equation and b) A Transaction CoSt 
Equation. 
Loan Demand Equation^ 
The demand for credit iS hypothesized to be determined by 
Six factorS: 1) the coSt of borrowing, made up of interest ex-
pense (i) and borrower transaction coSt (TC); 2) the Size of land 
owned by the borrower, uSed aS a measure of his wealth and 
resource endowment, aS well aS an indicator of his liquidity 
requirements for production (LRP); c) the borrower's liquidity 
requirements for consumption (LRC), determined by the Size of hiS 
household, the number of dependents and the level of education of 
the household head; 4) the type of bank borrowed from; 5) the 
policy period in which the loan waS acquired (before or after 
deregulation) and 6) the availability and availment of credit 
from informal SourceS. 
The loan demand equation iS Specified aS followS: 
InL = c + c InTc + C ln(i) + d InA + e (HHSIZE) + e DEP 
o 1 2 1 1 2 
+ e EDUC + f YEAR + f BANK + f INFORMAL 
3 1 2 3 
g 
where TC = borrower transaction coStS aS a percentage of loan 
amount received 
L = the loan amount applied for 
i = the real interest rate charged on the loan 
A = the area of land owned 
BANK = iS a dummy variable for type of bank 
BANK = 1 if RB 
BANK = 0 if not-RB 
YEAR = iS a dummy variable to distinguish if amount waS 
borrowed before or after deregulation of loan 
interest rateS 
YEAR = 1 if after deregulation (1986 to 1987) 
YEAR = 0 if before deregulation (1972 to 1985) 
HHSIZE = number of members in household 
DEP = number of dependents in household 
EDUC = yearS of Schooling of household head 
INFORMAL = dummy variable for availment by borrower of 
credit from informal SourceS 
INF = 1 if bank borrower haS alSo borrowed from 
informal lenders 
INF = 0 if otherwise 
Transaction CoSt Equation: 
Transaction coStS are hypothesized to be determined by the 
following factorS: 1) the Size of loan applied for by the 
borrower; 2) the interest rate; 3) the area of land owned by 
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borrower, hiS previous loan delinquency and the type of 
collateral, all indicators of the borrower's degree of riSk; 4) 
the type of bank; 5) the period of the loan (before or after 
deregulation) and 6) the distance of borrower's residence to the 
bank. 
The Transaction CoSt Equation iS Specified aS followS: 
InTC = a + a InL + a ln(i) + a InA + b COL + b DEL 
0 1 2 3 1 2 
+ b BANK + b YEAR + b DIST 
4 5 6 
where TC = borrowers' transaction coStS aS a percentage of loan 
amount received 
L = the loan amount applied for 
1 = the real interest rate charged on the loan 
A = the area of land owned 
COL = dummy variable for the type of collateral 
COL = 1 if collateral iS real estate 
COL = 0 if otherwise 
DEL = dummy variable for the previous repayment 
performance of the borrower. 
DEL = 1 if delinquent at any time in the paSt 
DEL = 0 if otherwise 
BANK = iS a dummy variable for type of bank 
BANK = 1 if RB 
BANK = 0 if not RB 
YEAR = iS a dummy variable to distinguish if amount waS 
borrowed before or after deregulation of loan 
interest rateS 
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YEAR = 1 if after deregulation (1986 to 1987) 
YEAR = 0 if before deregulation (1972 to 1985) 
DIST = distance to bank (measured by traveling time) 
The data uSed in the Study iS croSS-Section data from a 
household Survey conducted by the Agricultural Credit Policy 
Council (ACPC) in Six areaS in the country. A two-Stage Simple 
randbm Sampling Scheme waS uSed with rural barangayS aS the 
primary Sampling unit and households aS the Secondary Sampling 
unit. Questions for the Study were incorporated into the 
household questionnaire of the ACPC Survey, carried out in the 
laSt quarter of 1987. 
The Sample consists of 176 bank borrowing households, all 
from predominantly rural, agricultural areaS in the provinces of 
BatangaS, CamarineS Sur, PangaSinan, Iloilo, Negrofe Oriental and 
MiSamiS Oriental. Two thirds of the respondents were farmers, 
engaged mainly in crop production. 
4/ 
Since loanS in the Sample were made in different yearS 
within a 16-year period (1972 to 1987), theSe amounts have been 
converted into real termS, uSing a national GDP deflator with 
1972 aS the baSe year. 
1/ This referS to the moSt recent loan of borrower. 
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III. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Borrower transaction coStS (in peSoS of 19 72) wate computed 
for the Sample and totalled £22.21 (See Table 1). ThiS consists 
of the caSh outlay of £18.02 and the opportunity coSt of time of 
£4.19. The three largest expenSeS incurred by a borrower in the 
proqeSS of applying and receiving hiS loan were feeS (43%), 
transportation (29%) and food (22%). of the opportunity coSt of 
time, about two thirds waS due to time Spent in the bank 
premiSeS; the rebt waS due to time traveling to and from the 
bank. Rural bank borrowers had lower peSo transaction coStS than 
borrowers of non-rural banks, but relative to the loan amount 
received, TC (%) iS greater for rural bank borrowers. 
The simultaneous equations model Specified above waS 
estimated with the Survey data uSing two-Stage< leaSt SquareS 
(TSLS). The reSultS are Summarized in Table 2; parameter 
estimates and t-StatiSticS are Shown in Table 3. The coefficient 
2 5/ 
of determination (R ) in the loan demand equation iS low 
(.29), but thiS iS not unuSual for StudieS uSing croSS Sectional 
data. An examination of the correlation matrix Showed a low 
correlation among all variables, except for Household Size and 
Dependents, which had a correlation coefficient of .89. 
5/ 
The coefficient of determination in the TC equation iS 
negative (this iS possible under TSLS); and therefore a 
meaningless value. 
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Table 11 
BORROWER TRANSACTION COSTS 
IN PESOS OF 1972 
BY TYPE OF BANK AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: CaSh Outlay 
(1) 
Opportunity Cotet 
of Time* 
(2) 
Borrower Transaction 
Cofet 
( 1 + 2 ) 
Regulation Period: 
Rural Bank P21.99 
Non-Rural Bank** 23.75 
Total 2 2.44 
% 
83.9 
84.2 
84.0 
P4.22 
4.44 
4.27 
16.1 
15.8 16.0 
P26.21 100.0 
28.19 100.0 
26.71 100.0 
Deregulation Period: 
Rural Bank P 8.31 
Non-Rural Bank 13.67 
Total 13.46 
% 
72.7 
74. 7 
78.3 
P3.12 
4.63 
3.73 
27.3 
25.3 
21.7 
P11.43 
18.30 
17.19 
% 100.0 
100 .0 100.0 
Total Sample: 
Rural Bank P17.10 
Non-Rural Bank 19.77 
Total 18.02 
% 
81.7 
80.3 
81.1 
P3.82 
4.86 
4.19 
% 
18.3 
19.7 
18.9 
P20.92 
24.63 
22.21 
% 
100 .0 
100 .0 
100 .0 
Opportunity Co'st of Time = Total Hourte 
Per Hour.. 
X Average Real CoSt of Time 
Average Real Cotet of Time Per Hour: Bateed on Minimum Wagete and 
Allowanced Legislated in the Philippines, Institute of Labor and 
Manpower Studied, Ministry of Labor and Employment 
For Non-Agricultural Occupations:"Real Wage Rate, Outside Metro 
Manila For Agricultural Occupations: Real Non-Plantation WageS 
RateS BaSe Year = 1972; seasonality in Agricultural Work not 
covered. 
** Includes commercial bankS, private development bankS, PNB, DBP, 
cooperative rural banks, and Land Bank Cooperatives 
Source : Abiad, 19 88. 
Table 2 
FACTORS AFFECTING LOAN DEMAND AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Factors Affecting: Expected Actual 
Sign Sign Remarks 
Demand 
_ _ _ 
Transaction CoStS _ Significant 
Interest Rate - + 
Area of Land Owned • + + Significant 
Household Size + + 
Dependents + -
Education + + Significant 
a/ 
Year + - Significant 
b/ 
Bank i + -
Informal Credit + ' + 
Transaction CoStS 
Loan Amount + . + 
Interest Rate - -
Area of Land Owned — — 
a/ 
Year + — 
b/ 
Bank + S ignif icant 
Collateral - -
d/ 
Delinquency + -
Distance + + Significant 
5 / 
Dummy Variable YEAR: 0 = Regulated Period 
(1972-1985) 
1 = Deregulated Period 
(1986-1987) 
b/ 
Dummy Variable BANK: 0 = Non-Rural Bank 
1 = Rural Bank 
c/ 
Dummy Variable COLLATERAL: 0 =' Non-real estate 
1 = Real estate 
d/ 
Dummy Variable DELINQUENCY: 0 = No previous loan 
Delinquency 
1 = With previous loan 
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Table 10 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS/ 
TRANSACTION COST EQUATION AND LOAN DEMAND EQUATION 
Jointly Dependent Variables 
Transaction CoStS Loan Demand 
(InTC) (InL) 
Right-Hand Side Variables Estimate T-StatiStic Estimate T-StatiStic 
Loan Amount (InL) 0.4865 0. 8031 • 
Transaction CoSt (InTC) -0. 2910 -1. 8315* 
Interest Rate [ln(i)] -0. 2959 -0.2051 1. 0803 1. 3480 
Area of Land Owned (InA) -0. 1885 • -1.0510 0. 1714 1. 9798* 
Household Size (HHSIZE) 0. 1672 1. 6373 
Dependents (DEP) -0. 1375 -1. 2911 
Education (EDUC) 0. 0683 2. 5806* 
Year (YEAR) -0. 0005 -0.0009 -0. 7200 -2. 5362* 
Bank (BANK) 0. 9153 1.7690* -0. 0290 -0. 1173 
Collateral (COL) -1. 2689 -1.4189 
Delinquency (DEL) -0. 4096 -0.5973 
Distance (DIST) 0. 2301 2.7868* 
Informal 0. 0339 0.1224 
Intercept -3. 3713 -0.8895 6. 0941 13 .5559 
2 
R -0. 1936 0. 2917 
F-value 6.3855 
n=133 
* Significant at .10 or higher, 
SGurce : Abiad, 1988. 
6/ 
Transaction coStS were1 found to be an important 
determinant of loan demand, confirming the expected invertee 
relationship between the two variables. Other determinants of 
1/ 
loan demand found to be statistically Significant are a) the 
year of the loan (Regulated or Deregulated Period); b) area of 
land owned; and c) level of education, all Signficant at .10 or 
higher. Transaction CoStS and Year of the loan transaction are 
both inversely related to Loan Demand, while Land and Education 
are positively related. 
For the borrower, transaction coStS are an added outlay and 
aS our findings indicate, would make him borrow leSS aS hiS out-
of-pocket expenSeS and coSt of time Spent on the loan application 
increases. The reSultS indicate further that transaction coStS, 
aS one component of the coSt of borrowing, may be a more import-
ant determinant of loan demand than the explicit interest rate, 
at leaSt in a rural-baSed community. 
The negative Sign for the variable Year Showte that Loan 
demand waS greater in the regulated than in the deregulated 
period. ThiS may indicate that the decline in transaction coStS 
that came with deregulation (See Table 1) waS probably much 
Smaller in magnitude.compared to the riSe in interest coStS that 
y 
ThiS and all other references to transaction coStS refer 
to TC aS a proportion of loan amount received. The only 
exception iS TC in (and with reference) to Table 2, which 
indicates the peSo value of TC. 
V • Loan demand iS meaSured by the loan amount applied for by 
the borrower, referred to in the Study aS loan amount. In 
contrast, the term loan amount received refers to the actual 
Size of loan granted by the bank. 
came with liberalization. AS a reSult, the total coSt of 
borrowing (i + TC) waS higher in the deregulated period and loan 
demand declined. The higher level of demand in the regulated 
period may alSo be attributed to the generally more robust levels 
of economic activity in that period compared to the liberalized 
period. 
Two of the Seven variables in the transaction coStS equation 
were found to be Significant factors in determining the level of 
transaction coStS: the type of bank and the distance to the bank. 
The Bank dummy variable iS positively related to transaction 
coStS which ShowS that transaction coStS are higher for rural 
banks than for non-rural banks. This could be due to the large 
amount of supervised loanS handled by the rural banks, which 
carried with them highly time-conSuming Screening and procedural 
requirements. In addition, the clientele of rural banks, 
compared to commercial banks, private development banks and 
government banks, iS predominantly made up of, Small farmer 
borrowers, widely distributed in far.-off barrioS,. and therefore 
incurring much higher transaction coStS relative to the Small 
loan amounts they borrow. The Distance variable, measured by 
traveling time to and from the bank, haS a positive coefficient. 
ThiS ShowS that borrowers who live farther from-the bank will 
have higher TC levels. ThiS iS logical, Since part of TC iS made 
up of transportation expenSeS and the peSo value of travel time 
to and from the bank. 
The Six remaining variables in the equation—loan amount, 
interest rate, area of land owned, type of collateral, loan 
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delinquency and year of loan, were not Statistically 
Significant. This reSult iS surprising, particularly for the 
three riSk-related factorS: land, collateral and previous loan 
delinquency. Their lack of relationship to transaction costs 
could raiSe Some doubts aS1 to the effectiveness of loan and 
portfolio management in theSe bankS, particularly rural bankS, 
which make up two thirds of the Sample. It may indicate that 
rural bankS in general are deficient in theSe areaS of loan 
management. It may alSo Show that land collateral iS more 
"credible" aS a foreclosure device and rationing mechanism in 
commercial bankS and private development bankS than in rural 
bankS, where management may not follow through aS aggreSSively. 
Unfortunately, the number of each of theSe other bankS iS not 
Sufficiently large to give more conclusive anSwerS to theSe 
questions. 
A dummy variable teSt waS carried out to determine the role 
of the uSe of informal credit on the demand for credit in the 
formal market. The informal market aS an independent variable 
waS found not to be Significant in relation to loan demand. 
However, the positive Sign of the coefficient indicates that 
informal credit iS a complement rather than a substitute for bank 
credit. That iS, thoSe who borrow from the bank alSo borrow from 
the informal market. 
The Regulated and Deregulated PeriodS: A Comparison 
AS the Philippine economy Shifted to a liberalized financial 
environment, Some Structural changes took place in the financial 
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market. In this Section, we look into Some of theSe changes, 
with reSpect to their effects on transaction coStS. 
It muSt be kept in mind, however, that only the firSt two 
yearS of the deregulation period are covered by the Study in 
contrast with the 13-year coverage of the regulated period. What 
we have caught therefore iS only the reSult of firSt-phaSe 
adjustments, and it may take more time before the markets have 
completed their adjustment to the liberalized environment. 
Transaction coStS, an implicit coSt to the borrower over and 
above the explicit interest rate, waS found to be regressive in 
impact in both periods. This iS So whether we view transaction 
coStS aS a proportion of the loan amount received or aS a 
proportion of the nominal interest rate charged. Small borrowers 
are therefore penalized by an additional "tax" on borrowing over 
and above the interest rate, at rateS proportionally greater than 
thoSe paid by medium and large borrowers. 
TableS 4 and 5 Show Transactions CoSt aS a percentage of 
loan amount received, by loan Size and by bank for the two 
periods. It ShowS that in the Regulated Period, TC iS more than 2 
1/2 timeS larger for Small borrowers than for medium borrowers 
and about 1.7 timeS greater than for large borrowers. In the 
Deregulation period, average TC declines for all loan SizeS, aS 
expected, but the regressive pattern of the previous period iS 
Still Seen, and even magnified for Small relative to large 
Table 4 
TRANSACTION COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOAN AMOUNT RECEIVED 
BY LOAN SIZE AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: 
Regulated Period 
b/ 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Deregulated Period 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Total Sample 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Borrower^ 
No. % 
53 
34 
17 
104 
45 22 
2 
69 
9fi 
56 
19 
< 
173* 
C/ 
50.96% 
32.69% 
16.35% 
100.00% 
65.22% 
31.88% 
2. 90% 
100.00% 
56.65% 
32.37% 
10.98% 
100.00% 
TC (%) 
4.86 
1.74 
2.78 
3.50 
3.47 
1.55 
0.17 
2.64 
4. 23 
1.51 
2.51 
3.10 
a/ 
or 
a/ 
TC 
Loan Amount Received 
b/ 
(All in peteote of 1972): 
Small: P2,000 or lekk 
Medium: P2,001 to P10,000 
Large: P10,001 to P500,000 
Total ite leteS than 176 due to m i n i n g data in one 
more of the following variable^: date of loan, 
transaction cotetfe, and loan amount received. 
Source : Abiad, 1988. 
Table 4 
TRANSACTION COST AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOAN AMOUNT RECEIVED 
BY TYPE OF BANK AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: No. of Borrowerd 
a/ 
TC (%) 
No. % 
Regulated Period 
y Rural Bank 73 73.0 4.17 
Non-Rural Bank 27 27.0 2.08 
Total 100 100.0 3.60 
Deregulated Period 
Rural Bank 41 60. 3 2.41 
Non-Rural Bank 27 39.7 3.05 
Total 68 100. 0 2.66 
Total Sample 
Rural Bank 114 67. 8 3.54 
Non-Rural Bank 54 32.2 2.56 
Total 
c/ 
168 100.0 3.22 
a/ 
TC 
Loan Amount Received 
y 
Included commercial bankd, private development bankd, 
PNB, DBP, SLAd, cooperative rural bankd and Land Bank 
cooperative^. 
c/ 
Total id ledd than 176 due to midding data in one or 
more of the following variabled: date of loan, trandaction 
codtd, and loan amount received, 
d/ 
Totald differ from Table 4 due to a different number 
of valid obdervationd. 
Source : Abiad, 1988. 
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loanS. The difference between the TC of Small and medium loanS 
declined by about 55 percent in the PoSt-Deregulation period, but 
iS Still high at 230 percent. The general pattern supports the 
hypotheSiS that TC aS a percentage of loan received tends to be 
regressive, but it iS surprising that this regressive pattern waS 
not Significantly reduced after deregulation, aS would be 
expected. It iS possible that given more time, the neceSSary 
Structural adjustments will Still take place. 
While RBS borrowers exhibit TC levels which are more than 
double that of non-RB borrowers (Table 5), their TC decreased 
drastically in the Deregulation period, while the TC of non-RB 
borrowers increased. The latter could be attributed to the 
decrease in the average real loan Size of non-RB borrowers (See 
Table 7) in the Deregulated period. 
Tables- 10 and 11 present transaction coStS aS a percentage 
of the nominal interest rate. Since TC iS an added coSt to 
borrowing, over and above the explicit interest rate, it actS aS 
a kind of "tax" on borrowers. ThiS tax iiS what we are 
attempting to measure in the data presented in<thiS table. The 
data confirms once more the regressive nature of transaction 
coStSi In both the Regulated and Deregulated periods, TC aS a 
percentage of nominal interest rate iS Seen to be higher for 
Small loanS than for large loanS. The tax on Small loanS iS 
large in the Regulated period — 175 percent greater than for 
I T ™ " ™ 
The number of large borrowers iS too Small to make any 
SubStantive conclusions, but probably giveS Some indication that 
could be substantiated by further research. 
Table 4 
AVERAGE LOAN AMOUNT RECEIVED , NOMINAL AND REAL 
BY LOAN SIZE AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: 
Regulated Period 
y 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
D eregula ted Period 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Total Sample 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Borrowerb 
No. % 
Loan Size 
53 
34 
17 
104 
45 
22 
2 
69 
50.96% 
32.69% 
16.35% 
100.00% 
65.22% 
31.88% 
2.90% 
100.00% 
98 56.65% 
56 32.37% 
19 10.98% 
173 100.00% 
Nominal 
2,178 
6,571 
23,724 
7,136 
P 2,515 
11,258 
26,400 
5,996 
2,333 
8,412 
24,005 
6,681 
Real y 
P 1,044 
1,990 
9,697 
2,767 
P 387 
1,637 
3,827 
885 
P 742 
1,851 
9,079 
2,017 
y BaSe Year = 1972 
y 
(All in peSoS of 1972): 
Small: P2,000 or leSS 
Medium: P2,001 to P10,000 
Large: P10,001 to P500,000 
y 
Total iS leSS than 176 due to miSSing data in one or 
more of the following variable' : date of loan, transaction 
coStS, and loan amount received. 
Source : Abiad, 1988. 
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Table 11 
AVERAGE LOAN AMOUNT RECEIVED, NOMINAL AND REAL 
BY TYPE OF BANK AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average Borrowers 
NO. ' % 
Loan 
Nominal 
Size 
a/ 
Real 
Regulated Period 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
73 
27 
100 
73.0 
27.0 
100.0 
P6,599 
P7,718 
P6,901 
,210 
•F4,160 
¥2,131 
Deregulated Period 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
41 
27 
68 
60.3 
39.7 
100. 0 
P6,053 
P6,017 
P6,039 
•T 905 
-T 872 
2 892 
Total Sample 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
114 . 
54 
C/ 
168 
67.9 
32.1 
100. 0 
P6,402 
P6,868 
P6,552 
>F1,740 
-F2,516 
, 990 
Bake Year = 1972 
W Included commercial bankS, private development bankS, PNB, 
DBP, SLAS, cooperative rural bankS and Land Bank cooperatives. £/ 
Total iS leSS than 176 'due to miSSing data in one or more 
of the following variables: date of loan, transaction coStS, and 
loan amount received, 
d/ 
Totals differ from Table 6 due to a different number of 
valid observations. 
Source : Abiad, 19 88. 
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Table 10 
AVERAGE INTEREST RATES, NOMINAL AND REAL 
BY LOAN SIZE AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: 
Regulated Period 
b/ 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Deregulated Period 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Total Sample 
Small 
Mediurii 
Large 
Total 
Borrowers 
No. % 
Interest Rate 
Nominal 
53 
34 
17 
104 
45 
22 
2 
69 
50.96% 
32.69% 
16.35% 
100.00% 
65.22% 
31.88% 
2.90% 
100.00% 
98 56.65% 
56 32.37% 
19 10.98% 
d/ 
173 100.00% 
16.55 
16.32 
16.02 
16.38 
17.29 
20.48 
21.00 
18.42 
16.89 
17.95 
16.55 
12.20 
Real 
1/ 
-3.18 
-3.69 - 2 . 2 0 
-2.43 
16.33 
19.53 
19.83 
17.45 
6 . 2 6 
5.43 
4.06 
5.73 
a/ 
I 
V 
more 
BaSe Year = 1972 
(All in peSoS of 1972): 
Small: 2,000 or leSS 
Medium: 2,001 to 10,000 
Large: 10,001 to 500,000 
£ / 
Range of interest rateS: 
Regulated Period: 
Nominal ratete Minimum: 5.00% 
Real rateS Minimum: -44.34% 
Deregulated Period: 
Nominal rateS Minimum: 5.00% 
Real rateS Minimum: 4.23% 
d/ 
Total ite leSS than 176 due to miSSing data in one or 
of the following variables: date of loan, transaction 
Maximum: 30.00% 
Maximum: 18.01% 
Maximum: 30.00% 
Maximum: 29.23% 
coStS, and loan amount received. 
Source : Abiad, 1988. 
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Table 11 
AVERAGE INTEREST RATE * NOMINAL AND REAL 
BY TYPE OF BANK AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average Borrowerd 
No. 
Interedt Rate 
Nominal Real 
a/ 
Regulated Period 
b/ 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
73 
27 
100 
73.0 
27.0 
100.0 
16.349 
16.481 
16.385 
-0.023 
- 0 . 0 0 2 
-0.018 
Deregulated Period 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
41 
27 
68 
60. 3 
39.7 
100.0 
18.927 
17.878 
18.510 
0.178 
0.178 
0.178 
Totftl sample 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
114 
54 
< 
168' 
67. 8 
32.2 
100.0 
17.276 .049 
17.180 .088 
17.245 . 062 
a/ 
I 
k/ 
Bade Year = 1972 
Included commercial bankd, private development bankd, 
PNB, DBP, SLAd, cooperative rural bankd and Land Bank 
cooperatived. 
£ / 
Total id ledd than 176 dued to midding data in one or 
more of the following variabled: date of loan, dource of loan 
and interedt rate, 
d/ 
Totald differ from Table 4 due to a different number of 
valid obdervationd. 
Source : Abiad, 19 88. 
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Table 10 
TRANSACTION COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST RATE 
BY LOAN SIZE AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: Borrower^ 
No. % 
TC (%) 
Nominal Interest Rate 
'Regulated Period 
a/ 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Deregulated Period 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
Total Sample 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
53 
34 
17 
104 
45 
22 
2 
69 
50.96% 
32.69% 
16.35% 
100 .00% 
65.22% 
31.88% 
2.90% 
100.00% 
98 56.65% 
56 32.37% 
19 10.98% 
173 b 100.00% 
29.4% 
10.7% 
17.4% 
21.4% 
20.1% 
7.6% 
0 . 8% 
.14.3% 
?5.0% 
8.4% 
15.2% 
25.4% 
a/ 
(All in peSoS of 1972): 
Small: 2,000 or leSS 
Medium: 2,001 to 10,000 
Large: 10,001 to 500,000 
b/ 
Total iS leSS than 176 due to miSSing data in one or 
more of the following variables: date of loan, Source of loan 
and interest rate. 
Source : Abiad, 1988. 
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Table 11 
TRANSACTION COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST RATE 
BY TYPE OF BANK AND REGULATORY PERIOD 
Sample Average: Borrowers 
No., . % 
TC (%) 
Nominal Interest Rate 
Regulated Period 
a/ 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
73 
27 
100 
73.0% 
27. 0% 
100.0% 
.29% 
.16% 
.26% 
Deregulated Period 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
41 
28 
69 
59.4% 
40. 6% 
100.0% 
.14 
.27 
.19 
Total Sample 
Rural Bank 
Non-Rural Bank 
Total 
114 
54 
168 b 
67. 8% 
32.2% 
100.0% 
.24 
.22 
.23 
a/ 
Included commercial bankS, private development bankS, 
PNB, DBP, SLAS, cooperative rural banks and Land Bank 
cooperatives. 
b/ 
Total iS leSS than 176 due to miSSing data in one or 
more of the following variables: date of loan, transaction 
coStS, and loan amount received. Variables: date of loan, 
Source of loan and interest rate. 
Source : Abiad, 19 88. 
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medium and 69 percent more than for large loanS. ThiS regreddive 
trend remains high in the Deregulation period, with the tax on 
Small loanS greater than that on medium and large loans by 164 
percent and 2,412 percent respectively. On the one hand, the 
expected regressive nature of TC iS confirmed by loan Size. On 
the other hand one would have expected this regressive incidence 
to be reduced during the period of deregulation. But thiS did not 
occur. Again, this iS contrary to the expected reSultS. 
The Shift from Regulation to Deregulation alSo Saw the 
following changeS: 
a) a decline in the volume and in the real value of loanS, 
acroSS all loan SizeS and acroSS all banktyped probably 
reflecting tighter credit market conditions during the 
more recent recessionary of yearS; 
b) an increaSe in interest rateS, both nominal and real, 
but with the increase in nominal rated for Small loand 
80 percent dmaller than that for medium and large loand; 
and 
c) a decline in the number of borrowers of RBS while the 
number of borrowers of non-RBS increased. 
J,,'.P..'...Crotedi Country Comparison 
Five different StudieS made between 1981 and 1983 covered 
agricultural credit programs in the following underdeveloped 
countried: Bangladedh (Ahmed 1982), Ecuador, Panama and Peru 
(Inter-American Development Bank 1983), and Hondurad (CuevaS 
1984). TheSe StudieS involved field SurveyS at the farm level 
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and documented the explicit and implicit non-interest coStS which 
were incurred by borrowers in the process !of Securing and 
repaying their agricultural loanS. The reSultS of theSe StudieS 
in relation to borrower transaction coStS were reviewed by CuevaS 
and Graham (1984) and it waS concluded that "the intended effect 
of credit policies involving a low and relatively uniform 
interest rate iS not attained." "Jhey pointed out that instead, 
a Skewed, regressive Structure of total credit coStS (interest 
rate pluS transaction coStS) iS obtained. ThiS iS reflected by 
the data for the five countries in Table 12. Transaction coStS 
aS a percentage of loan amount iS Shown in Panel A, while 
transaction coStS aS a proportion of the interest rate charged iS 
Shown in Panel B. In both caSeS, the Sample average, aS well aS 
the averages for three loan Size categories are reported in the 
table. 
The reSultS for the Philippines, baSed on the findings of 
thiS Study are Shown in the laSt three columns of the table. 
Before a croSS country comparison iS made, it iS important to 
point out two major differences between the Philippine Study and 
thoSe of the five Countries in the table. FirSt, the Philippine 
Study iS not limited to farmers aS respondents nor to 
agricultural loans, while the 5 other StudieS focuS on farmers 
and agricultural credit. Secondly, while all (including the 
Philippine Study) are croSS Section studies, the loanS in the 
Philippine Study, representing "the moSt recent loan" of the 
respondent, were acquired in different yearS over a -16-year 
period, while loanS in each of the 5 StudieS were acquired in a 
Table 12 
CROSS COUNTRY COMPARISON OF BORROWER TRANSACTION COSTS 
BY LOAN SIZE FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE 1980s 
Transaction Costs Bangladesh Ecuador Honduras Panama Peru Philippines 
By Loan Size REG DEREG TOTAL 
A. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of Loan Amount 
Sample Average 21.7% 2.8% 3.0% 5.2 1.2% 3.5% 2.6% 3.1 
Snail Loans 29.4 5.3 5.9 5.7 3.9 4.9 3.5 4.2 
Medium Loans 17.5 2.0 1,6 3.0 1.3 1.7 1,5 1.5 
Large Loans 7,0 0.6 0.2 2.0 1.0 2.8 0.2 2.5 
B. Transaction Costs as 
1 
Percent of Explicit-
Interest Charges 
Sample Average 180.8% 22.9% 23.1% 46.4% 4.0% 21.4% 14.3% 25.4% 
Small Loans 245.0 47,7 45.4 50.9 13.0 29.4 20.1 25.0 
Medium Loans 145.8 17.3 12.3 26.8 4.3 10.7 7.6 8.4 
Large Loans 58.1 4.1 1.5 17.9 3.3 17.4 0.8 15.2 
Source: Cuevas «nd Graham, (1984); Philippine data fron Abiad, 1988. 
Note: 1) Source of Data for 5 Countries: Bangladesh, Ahmed (1982); Honduras, Cuevas (1984); 
Ecuador, Panana and Peru, Inter-American Development Bank (1983). 
2) Panel B Data: based on the levels of explicit interest rate reported in the 
different sources, e.g., for Bangladesh the average transaction costs in 
Panel A was 21.11 and the explicit rate reported by Ahaed is 12*, 
therefore (21.7/12)*100 = 180.8*. 
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narrower range of yeard. In Spite of thede differpnced, it id 
believed that the data for the Six countries iS !Still comparable. 
If Bangladesh id excluded becaude of itd extreme valued, the 
Philippines and the five Latin American countries exhibit TC (ad 
a percent of loan amount) which ranged from a low of 1.2 percent 
for Peru to 5.2 percent for Panama. The Philippine figure id 
midway within thiS range, at 3.1 percent for the entire dample, 
but higher for the Regulated period (3.5%) than for the 
Deregulated (2.6%). The magnitude for Bangladesh id 21.7 
percent, more than four timed greater than that of Panama. The 
unuSual values of TC (both aS a proportion of loan amount (Panel 
A) and of interest rate (Panel B) iS attributed to the unuSually 
Small loan Size characteristic of the Bangladesh Survey, in 
comparison to thode recorded in the Latin American StudieS. It 
iS reasonable to conclude from the data that Philippine loan Size 
distribution iS cloSer to the latter than to thoSe Seen in 
Bangladesh. 
All Six countries Show a regressive TC Structure, ad Seen in 
the comparison of the TC levels of Small loand to thode of medium 
and large loand. In the Honduras cade, TC for Small* loanS iS 30 
timeS aS high aS thoSe for large loanS; 8.8 percent in Ecuador, 
2.9 percent in Panama. Compared to theSe, the Philippine ratios 
are lower: 2.8 percent for Small loanS compared to medium, and 
only 1.7 for Small loanS compared to large. However, aS pointed 
out earlier, the regressive pattern for the Philippines, when 
compared to the two periodd in the dtudy, id more pronounced 
before Deregulation than after. 
The figured in Panel B indicate the additional "tax" impoSed 
on borrowers over and above the explicit interest they pay on the 
loaii. ThiS ranges, on the average, from 4.0 percent for Peru to 
180.8 percent for Bangladesh. The TC tax level in the 
Philippines iS not far from the levels Seen in Ecuador and 
Honduras, and in all Six countries, placefe a heavier burden on 
Small than large loanS. In the Philippines, theSe differences 
are magnified aS the country moved to a deregulated environment. 
The larger the tax imposed by transaction coStS on the 
borrower, the greater the disincentive to borrow, aS the coSt of 
credit becomes more expensive. Table 12 ShowS that implicit 
coStS (TC) are large relative to the nominal interest rate for 
all countries except Peru, and are considerably greater for the 
Small borrower than for the medium or large borrowers. ThiS 
SuggeStS that transaction coStS, aS an implicit price mechanism, 
bring about allocative effects in the credit market, favoring 
large borrowers and penalizing Small borrowers. ThiS iS true 
even if interest rateS are held down by fiat, aS the larger 
transaction coStS of Small borrowers may more than offset the 
"cheapness" of interest rateS. 
At leaSt two other StudieS have looked into the determinants 
of borrowers' transaction coStS: the Ahmed Study for Bangladesh, 
and the CuevaS Study for Honduras. USing a Single equation 
model, Ahmed concludes that transaction coStS aS a percent of 
loan amount, 1) decreases with increases in loan Size, 2) de-
creases with increases in the explicit interest rate and 3) 
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declined the greater the Social and political StatuS of the 
borrower iS in the community. In the Honduras Study CuevaS 
confirmed the findings (1 and 2 .above) of Ahmed regarding 'the 
relation between TC, loan Size and explicit interest rateS. In 
addition, he concluded that TC iS greater for Small than for 
large loanS, and higher for private than for development bankS, 
given the loan Size and interest rate. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Three major conqluSionS can be drawn from the reSultS of 
this Study. FirSt, transaction coStS play an important role in 
the demand for credit and in the rationing of credit among 
borrower claSSeS. Second, the lifting of interest rate 
restrictions decreased the absolute level of transaction coStS in 
the Deregulation period compared to the Regulated period, but 
the change waS not statistically Significant, indicating that 
Some barriers Still may be preventing its full effect. And third, 
transaction coStS in the Philippines aS elsewhere, have a 
regressive impact on borrowers. This regreSSivity worSenS 
instead of improving after deregulation. Each of theSe 
conclusions are diScuSSed in greater detail below. 
The Significance of transaction coStS aS a determinant of 
loan demand points out that borrowers reSpond to transaction 
coStS in the Same manner and for the Same reaSonS that they 
reSpond to interest rateS. To borrowers, transaction coStS are 
an important real coSt of borrowing over and above the interest 
rate charged, and to the extent that this increase iS greater in 
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proportion to the Size of the loan or to the amount paid .in 
interest, the greater will be the dampening of the demand for 
credit. A rational borrower will borrow leSS the higher the 
level of transaction coStS and vice verSa. ThiS iS confirmed by 
the reSultS of the Study. 
The following were found to be important factors in 
determining a borrower's decision to apply for a loan, and the 
amount applied for: 1) the total coSt of borrowing (transaction 
coStS pluS the explicit interest rate charged); 2) the year of 
loan application; 3) area of owned land; and 4) the liquidity 
requirements for consumption (LRC) of the household. The latter 
iS measured by three variables: level of education, household 
Siae and the number of dependents. Taken individually, only 
education waS found to be Significant, but taken jointly, the 
three variables were found to be a Significant determinant of 
loan demand. The lower the coSt of borrowing, the larger the 
area of land owned and the greater the household's liquidity 
requirements for consumption, the larger will be the demand for 
credit. 
The level of transaction coStS, on the other hand, are 
determined by two factorS: distance to the bank and, type of bank. 
The farther the bank from the borrower's residence, the higher 
the transaction coStS. Borrowers of rural bankS alteo have higher 
transaction coStS than borrowers from non-rural banks. 
The negative Sign for the variable Year of application iS 
aS expected, indicating that transaction cotette declined aS the 
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country moved into the Deregulation period. However, the fact 
that this variable iS not statistically Significant may be an 
indication that Some barriers Still exist, e.g., an 
oligopolistic Structure of the financial market, preventing the 
full effects of deregulation in reducing transaction coStS. 
Transaction coStS are alSo Seen to have a regressive impact 
on borrowers, taxing Small borrowers by aS much aS 270 percent 
more than medium and large borrowers. Deregulation, instead of 
minimizing thiS regressive effect haS instead brought about an 
increase in its magnitude. 
Recommendations 
In order to increase the efficiency of financial inter-
mediation, StepS are required to minimize transaction coStS for 
borrowers and lenders. AS mentioned in this Study, transaction 
coStS are a meaSure of the friction that exists in the 
functioning of financial markets. The higher the transaction 
coStS, the higher will be the coStS of intermediation and the 
more inefficient will be the performance of the financial 
intermediaries involved in the delivery of credit. 
Forty three percent of the caSh outlay incurred in the 
prOceSS of applying and receiving a loan are attributable to 
"feeS paid" and two thirds of the hourS Spent in the proceSS iS 
"time Spent in bank premiSeS". Both of theSe coStS would 
decline if the information gathering procedures, particularly 
thoSe done in compliance with Central Bank requirements, can be 
Significantly decreased. One recent Study (GoraleS and CuevaS 
1987) ShowS that the number of documents required by the Central 
Bank and the time and manpower required to complete thiS 
documentation on a periodic baSiS iS substantial. While Some of 
theSe documents and proceSSeS may be neceSSary for the careful 
Selection of borrowers and allocation of funds, a careful Study 
of the documents and procedures could reSult ijv a Streamlining of 
the process and a minimization of time and manpower for the 
lender, aS well aS a decreaSe in the caSh outlay and time Spent 
by the borrower. ThiS burden of Streamlining the documentation 
proceSS Should fall on the government, Specifically the 
supervision and Examination SectionS of the Central Bank. 
AS pointed out by Ladman (1984), borrowers face an out-of-
pocket expenSe threshold beyond which they will not apply for a 
loan. The borrower who doeS not have the funds to cover thiS 
threshold will pre-Select himSelf out of the credit market, and 
not apply for a loan. Transaction coStS Should therefore be low 
enough So they do not diScourage potential borrowers, especially 
Small farmers, from applying for a loan. 
Two factors found to be Significant determinants of the 
level of transaction coStS were a) distance and b) type of 
bank. Government can diminish the distance problem through the 
provision of more roadS, bridges and other improvements in rural 
transportation. AlSo, the financial institution. haS to be 
brought cloSer to the borrower to dim,iniSh his transportation 
coSt and increase the lenders' accessibility. If the number of 
financial institutions that can be put within "borrowing 
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distance" (i.e., branches) of farmers and rural households iS 
limited, the other alternative iS to uSe the informal lenders 
that are already cloSely located to the borrowers. In Bangladesh 
the transaction coStS for Small loanS from the formal lender and 
from the informal lender were 30 percent and' 2.5 percent, 
respectively, with the difference attributed to the Simple 
processing and ShortneSS of distance of informal lenders to 
borrowers (Ahmed 1982). ThiS alternative, (i.e., financial 
institutions lending to informal lenders, who in turn lend to the 
Small, distant borrowers), Should be SeriouSly Studied to 
determine the coStS arid benefits of carrying out Such a Scheme. 
ThiS can be tried on an experimental baSiS ; to evaluate its 
merits. 
One encouraging Step in thiS direction iS the recent efforts 
9/ 
of a non-government umbrella organization to improve acceSS of 
the informal Sector to banking services (Elanto 1987). ThiS move 
haS found Support from the government Sector. A Solution to the 
piroblem of the low accessibility of banks and the low bankability 
of farmers, iS the promotion of linkages between banking 
institutions and Self-help groups (SHGS) to reduce the 
transactions coSt of rural finance to marginal clientele. SHGS 
are informal, graSSrootS organizations formed to addreSS group-
~ 97 — . 
Promotion of linkages iS Spearheaded by the Philippine 
Council for Rural SavingS and Finance (PCRSF), an umbrella non-
government organization organized in October 1986. ThiS 
organization aimS to promote SavingS-baSed financial SyStem via 
Self-help groups in RFMS; technical and consultative ServiceS 
are provided by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC). 
Specific problems in the rural areaS. TheSe SHGS which include 
many Small farmers among their members, are engaged in productive 
economic activities, and moSt importantly, perform regular 
lending and Saving functions for their members. Unlike rural 
bankS which have been highly dependent on cheap rediscount funds 
from the Central Bank, theSe informal organizations generate 
funds for lending from the SavingS of their members and from 
other * internally generated SourceS. 
The innovative attempts in t h i s direction Should be Se-
riouSly Studied and pursued. It could be one anSwer to the 
perenially elusive problem of Small farmer acceSS to bank credit. 
Two possible linkage models are suggested by Llanto, both of 
which See the uSe of the pooled SavingS mobilized by SHGS aS a 
guarantee fund againSt which they can borrow aS a group from 
bankS. The SavingS generated by SHGS then can Serve aS the 
collateral or credit guarantee needed by bankS. ThiS SolveS one 
other problem of credit acceSS for the Small farmer: lack of 
acceptable collateral, particularly land. The SHG Solution 
makeS the previously non-bankable farmer bankable through hiS 
membership with the SHG. The transaction coStS for the borrower 
and the lending and information coStS for the lenders, under Such 
an arrangement, would be Significantly lower, and the probability 
that the Small borrower will be rationed in favor of the big 
borrower iS minimized. 
Much resistance iS expected when pushing for the utilization 
of informal lenders in government-led credit delivery SchemeS, 
particularly becauSe of the long-time biaS againSt them. Thought 
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of ab charging uSuriouS rateS and Suspected of earning monopoly 
profits at the'expenbe of the Small borrowers, they are a Sector 
that haS been diSliked yet tolerated ever Since biblical timeS. 
However, Some mythS are Slowly crumbling aS new knowledge iS 
unearthed about theSe informal lenderS. studies Such aS thobe by 
Floro (1986) and ESguerra (1987) have thrown new light on the 
operations of thiS Sector. 
# 
More Support for the mobilization of the informal Sector in 
the delivery of formal credit haS been Seen in recent yearte. 
Meyer (1987) points out that uSing the informal Sector may be the 
only way financial ServiceS can be provided to the poor, distant 
rural households. The high coSt of Servicing Such customers 
would ordinarily ration them out in the credit allocation 
decisions of formal institutions. Similarly, Lamberte and Lim 
(1987) argue for the interlinking of markets through farmers 
cooperatives which they claim could increase farmer acceSS to 
institutional capital, and to financial and trading markets. 
Some experimental group-lending projects have been tried with 
great SucceSS in Bangladesh (YunuS 1981). TheSe have been found 
to reduce the borrowers' transaction coStS and decrease the 
probability of default due to Social and peer pressure within the 
group. 
If the rural population of thiS country iS the main concern 
of the government, aS it muSt be Since they comprise 70 percent 
of the country's population, innovative programs muSt be tried 
to reduce transactions coStS and increase acceSS for financial 
Serviced. Only then can agricultural credit and SavingS 
facilities reach the Small rural clientele. 
The higher transaction coStS of rural bank borrowers 
compared to thoSe of other,bankS, Should be of concern to the 
government. Rural bankS were created to facilitate credit 
delivery to the countryside, and to put credit within the reach 
of the Small, rural borrowers. However, due to the large number 
of supervised and Special credit programs channeled through the 
rural banks, the amount of processing and documentation that goeS 
.1 
into 'the loan proceSS of theSe banks iS quite substantial. It iS 
likely therefore that at leaSt part of thiS additional coSt iS 
paSSed on to the borrowers, accounting for the higher TC 
associated with loanS from rural banks. AS suggested earlier, a 
Streamlining of the documentation proceSS required by the Central 
Bank for the different lending programs may lead to a lowering of 
TC of borrowing. One other reaSon for the higher TC of rural 
bank borrowers iS that rural bankS cater mostly to Small 
borrowers, while commercial and government bankS have a loan 
portfolio largely concentrated on large, commercial loanS 
(Lamberte and Lim 1987). The many Small borrowers of rural banks 
are more distantly located and incur more expenSeS (particularly 
the coSt of transportation and the opportunity coSt of time) in 
the courSe of applying for a loan. The recommendations given 
earlier regarding improvement of transportation inStructure and 
the interlinking of formal markets with informal lenders or SHGS 
would help to minimize theSe transactions coStS. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
FirSt, it iS important to document the transaction costs ot 
the informal market and compare this with the formal market. A 
differentiation Should be made between loanS from farmer lenders, 
trader lenders, friends and relatives, and informal associations 
like Self-help groups and cooperatives. The differential effects 
on borrower behavior, borrower coStS and borrower acceSS to 
loanS will be important information to guide crtedit policy. 
Second, additional factors important in determining 
transaction coStS need to be investigated. For example, the role 
of political and Social influence, which Ahmed found to be 
Significant in Bangladesh, and the effect of perSonalibm. 
While the former refers to the influence of the borrower in the 
community, the latter referS to perSonal influence because of 
friendship, blood relationship (a couSin of the teller, etc.) or 
previous interactions (the mechanic of the manager) with bank 
personnel. TheSe are expected to affect the level of transaction 
coStS in a very perSonaliStic Society like the Philippines, and 
would differ with the Source of the loan, particularly when 
comparing formal and informal SourceS. studies Should alSo 
look into changes in the non-price contract termS of loanS aS a 
credit rationing mechanism of lenders. GonzaleS-Vega haS Shown 
that in addition to changes in loan Size and the interest rate 
and transaction coStS imposed upon the borrower, another credit 
rationing tool involves changes in the termS of the loan 
contract. Specifically what aSpectS of the loan are affected, 
43 
and their degree of importance in affecting the borrower's credit 
decisions would be uSeful information. 
Third, a Study of the documentation proceSS of all typete of 
bankS iS called for to determine which of theSe are absolutely 
neceSSary for determining borrower credit worthiness and which 
can be eliminated in order to attain a higher level of 
effectiveness and efficiency, and in order to lower lender and 
borrower transaction coStS. 
Finally, the impending land reform program could add 
considerably to borrower transaction coStS for land reform 
beneficiaries. Financial intermediaries will become "credit Shy" 
in the face of the Seven hectare retention limit and the possible 
inability of the reform beneficiarieS to uSe their newly granted 
land aS bank collateral. More Severe credit rationing will occur 
within thiS Scenario with increased transaction coStS for 
borrowers, especially land reform beneficiarieS, ReSearch needs 
to be undertaken to document and interpret the impact of land 
reform legislation on bank behavior, credit rationing and 
borrower transaction coStS. ThiS will likely turn out to*be the 
Single most important factor conditioning borrower transactions 
coStS in the future in the Philippines. 
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